Stem Cell Research Truths: The debate continues

By Patrick Lee & Robert P. George

 

[Pro-Life InfonetNote:  The following is the latestin a series of op-ed

debates between the authors and Ronald Bailey, apro-embryonic stem cell research writer for Reason Magazine. Mr. Lee isassociate professor of philosophy at the Franciscan University of Steubenville.Mr. George is the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at PrincetonUniversity.]

 

In attempting to justify the destruction of embryonic humanbeings to

harvest their stem cells, Ronald Bailey has, on the onehand, conceded

that you and I were once embryos, and, on the other hand,insisted that

human embryos are not distinct organisms at all. Thus,Bailey has managed

to back himself into the absurd position of suggesting thathuman beings

at more mature stages of development once existed as embryosbut were,

during the embryonic stage, something other than distinctorganisms (and

yet has also admitted that we are essentially physicalorganisms).

 

The truth, of course, is that you and I came into existenceprecisely at

the point at which the distinct human organism that is nowyou or I came

into existence. It is true to say that each of us was oncean embryo,

because the distinct, self-integrating, human, physicalorganism that is

now you or me is identical to, or continuous with, thedistinct,

self-integrating, human organism that was, at earlier stagesof

development, an adolescent, a child, an infant, a fetus,and, at the dawn

of his or her life, an embryo. If the embryo were in factsomething other

than a distinct, self-integrating organism if it were, likesperm cells,

ova, or somatic cells, merely part of another human beingthen it would

not be correct to say that you or I were once embryos, anymore than it

would be correct to say that you or I were once sperm cells,or ova, or

(in the case of someone who was brought into being bycloning) somatic

cells. So Bailey is right to concede that we were onceembryos and utterly

wrong to insist that embryos are not distinct organisms.

 

Bailey's denial of the fact that embryos are distinctorganisms is meant

to support his claim that when we were embryos we were not"people." We

have made two points about this claim. First, Bailey'sargument for it

turns out to be philosophical rather than scientific. Ittherefore does

nothing to fulfill his original promise to establish as amatter of

scientific fact that human embryos are not human beings.Second, the claim

is philosophically untenable. Either it mistakenly identifiesthe human

person with something other than the human organism, or itdenies that we

are intrinsically worthwhile because of what we are, asopposed to our

properties, states, talents, etc. (and thus deserve thetitle, "persons").

 

In our exchanges with Bailey, we have defended the followingset of

propositions:

 

(1) What we are is a human, physical organism.

 

(2) We are intrinsically worthwhile because of what we are,not just

because of characteristics we acquire at some point in ourlife.

 

(3) Therefore, all human, physical organisms areintrinsically worthwhile

(and hence are "people").

 

Not only did we present arguments to support (1) and (2),but Bailey has

at different times expressly admitted both of thosepremises. When Bailey

in his last article claims that, "we know for sure thatpeople all have

human brains," that simply begs the question. If youonce were a human

embryo (as Bailey rightly concedes) then you once existed ata time before

you had a brain, just as you existed before you had permanentteeth (or

any teeth for that matter), and just as you existed beforeyou had lungs.

And if you are intrinsically valuable because of what youare (which

Bailey has also conceded), then an entity which hasintrinsic value (and

so is a "person") exists at all times that youexist.

 

The only colorable ground for saying that a human organismneeds a brain

to be a "person" is to claim that one must have animmediately exercisable

capacity for consciousness. When we set forth reasons forrejecting any

such claim, Bailey replied that we erroneously accused him"of defining

human beings in terms of their being conscious or havingmental

functions." But if this is not how Bailey defines humanbeings, then why

does he think that a human organism must have a brain inorder to be a

person? If a whole human being is a person, and does notneed to have an

immediately exercisable capacity for consciousness to be aperson, then

why are those human individuals at developmental stagesprior to complete

brain development not people? (Of course, the embryopossesses from the

start the epigenetic primordia for brain development and is,indeed,

actively developing a brain, just as he or she is developingall the other

bodily organs he or she will possess at maturity.)

 

The only alternative is to hold that the embryo or fetusmust have a brain

in order to be a distinct organism at all, that prior to theappearance of

the brain (at eight weeks when a complete brain hasdeveloped, or at three

weeks when the primitive streak appears, which is plainlyits primordium,

or before that, when the cells appear which also constitutethe primordium

of the brain?) the embryo is (somehow) not really a distinctorganism. Is

this Bailey's position? If so, it is plainly false. Whatcould the embryo

possibly be? He or she (for the sex is determined from thebeginning) is

clearly not a part of the mother, nor a part of the father,nor a stray

cell, nor a mere clump of cells, for this highly organizedbeing is

growing in a definite self-directed manner, toward the moremature stage

of a human organism.

 

Not being able to maintain consistently that we once werehuman organisms

but were not people (since at different points he hasconceded each

premise of the argument that refutes it), Bailey falls backon his denial

that the human embryo is distinct a denial that ismanifestly inconsistent

with his concession that we once were human embryos.

 

The origin of Bailey's errors appears to be his suppositionthat the

pro-life argument is that human embryos are distinct humanbeings merely

because each has a distinct genetic code. If this were thepro-life

argument, then the facts of cloning and twinning wouldrefute it. But, as

we have pointed out, it isn't. Everyone knows that there arevarious

things that, though not human beings, have a distinct andfully human

genetic makeup a culture in a petri dish waiting to betested for strep

infection, or a beating heart on ice awaitingtransplantation, for

example. (Contrary to what Bailey implies at the end of hismost recent

article, such facts are scarcely "recent scientificdiscoveries.") The

fact is that having a distinct genetic make-up is sufficientto prove in

most cases that the developing embryo is not a part of themother or the

father. That still is true for identical twins or for anembryo who might

generate an identical twin from his or her cells. But it isobviously not

sufficient to show, nor does anyone think that it issufficient to show,

that these embryos are whole human beings. What does showdecisively that

embryos are whole human organisms (and distinct fromidentical twin

siblings, if they have any, or from donors, if they areclones) is the

self-integration and self-direction of maturation and growththat these

embryos actively maintain; they do not function as parts oflarger

organisms, but each functions as a whole organism of thehuman species,

directing his or her own integral organic functioning.

 

Bailey has never faced up to our original reply to hisargument that human

embryos are no different in value and worth from any of oursomatic cells

because somatic cells are like embryos in possessing a fullgenetic code.

We pointed out that this argument ignores the massivedifference between

human embryos and somatic cells: Human embryos are, and somaticcells are

not, whole organisms actively developing themselves (unlessprevented from

doing so) to maturation.

 

Bailey has fallen back on arguing that human embryos are notdistinct

organisms because the fact of twinning and the possibilityof cloning

disprove any great discontinuity between any of our somaticcells and

human embryos, or between the totipotent cells within anembryo before he

or she twins, and a human embryo. He argues that, "whatwe see is a series

of proper environments needed for human DNA to begin theprocess of

embryonic development." So, "there is a series ofproper environments

needed for human DNA to begin the process of embryonicdevelopment." What

Bailey actually asks us to believe is that each of ourcells, even while

it is part of us and functions as part of the whole organismthat we are,

is the same kind of thing, with the same kind ofpotentiality, as a whole

human embryo, who is directing its own integral organicfunctioning and

actively developing himself or herself to maturity. If thatwere so, then

each of our cells already would be a whole organism, onlywaiting for the

proper environment to begin maturation. But that is absurd.

 

The human embryo and each somatic cell are similar in thisone respect:

each has the entire human genetic code or information whichcould in the

right circumstances guide the self-development of a wholehuman organism

to maturity. But the discontinuity is undeniable: the humanembryo, but

not the somatic cell, is actively making use of that geneticinformation

for its own self-directed maturation. So, to the argumentindicated above,

numbered (1) through (3) we can add:

 

(4) Biology (and, in particular, the subfield of humanembryology) shows

that distinct, whole human organisms come to be when thereis generated a

distinct organism actively developing its forces andelements toward its

own more mature stages of development. (This occurs usuallywith the

fusion of the spermatazoon and the oocyte. With monozygotictwins, a

second distinct organism comes to be with the extrinsicdivision of the

first embryo that was generated by fertilization. Finally,in cloning, a

new organism comes to be with the fusion and activation ofthe chromosomes

of a somatic cell with an enucleated ovum.)

 

Incidentally, Bailey entirely missed the point of ourargument concerning

infant mortality. It is simply this: The highinfant-mortality rates that

characterized societies for most of human history provide nolegitimate

ground for denying the status of infants as human beings. Byprecisely the

same token, high rates of early miscarriage do nothing todisprove the

humanity of embryonic human beings.

 

Bailey's argument in the last paragraph of his most recentsalvo is simply

confused. It is obvious, he contends, that unimplantedembryos are not

people because no one tries to rescue them. Yet some peopledo try to

rescue them, and, as a matter of fact, that is what we aretrying to do

just now. Moreover, let us remind Bailey that the questionwe are debating

is precisely how we should treat unimplanted embryos. Itproves nothing to

argue that a class of human individuals are not personsbecause others

fail to treat them as persons, and to argue this preciselyin a debate

where one's opponents are in fact urging their readers totreat them as

persons. The analogy cannot be avoided: It is like arguingagainst

abolitionists that slaves are not persons because othersfail to treat

them as persons.