If it is human, is it aperson?
by Andy Ho
EMBRYONIC stem-cell researchers say that 'being a human' isnot always quite the same as 'being a person' with the right to life.
They argue thatalthough foetuses are more than mere human cells, they are not persons untilthey begin to function in a certain way.
For some, thisis not at least until it is 40 days old, when brain waves are detectable.
For others, itis the middle or late second trimester, when the foetus is able to feel andsense as a conscious being.
Others say itis a person only when it is capable of communication, solving complex problems,self-motivated activity and having a
self-concept.
Pro-liferscounter that these criteria merely point to some functions a human does but donot cover all the conditions that render a
person a person.
For example,when I am asleep, or unconscious, I am not exercising rational thought, but Iam no less a person.
So personhoodis not something that arises only as and when certain functions take place.
Consider twonewborn twins, Beng who becomes self-conscious for a while, then lapses into acoma for a year, after which he awakens;
and Lian who is born comatose, never attainsself-consciousness, but awakens at the same moment.
Is it permissibleto kill Lian but not Beng the very day before they awaken?
No.
Both arepersons who differ only by function - Beng attained self-consciousness, Liandid not. They do not differ in essence or
nature.
So personhoodis the ground from which mental functions emerge - it is our nature, a thingthat exists even before the conscious
abilities found within it unfold.
Now, suppose AhKow who has been comatose for a year awakens with all his faculties intact,even though he has lost some weight, hair,
and some memory.
Would it bemorally right for doctors to kill him while he was comatose since he was not aperson?
No.
Suppose Ah Kowawakens without any memory or ability to speak, engage in rational thought, orhave a self-concept, but then re-learns
them. What then?
Clearly, whilecomatose, Ah Kow still has the potential because of his human nature, to speak,think, and have a self-concept - much
like a foetus.
So a persondoes not begin to exist only when certain human functions arise. Rather, aperson is a human with the inherent capacity to
have human functions, whether they develop or not.
For example, achild may not speak English because of a lack of education. But because thechild has human nature, he can learn
English.
Conversely, a rabbitthat does not bark lacks nothing, for by nature it does not.
In contrast, byits particular nature, a dog can ultimately bark. It may die as a puppy thathas only yelped and never barked, but it
is still a dog as long as it exists, because of its nature.
In short, eachliving thing has a nature that makes certain activities and functions possible.It cannot lose that nature and
continues to exist.
A human tooyoung or too disabled to think rationally is still a person because of hisnature.
The unborn hasthis capacity from the moment it begins to exist, so it is a person as long asit exists.
The unborn isnot a potential person but a person with great potential.
Its personhood,its self, remains the same over time from the moment it begins to exist.
Some foetalresearchers deny that there is such a thing as a self remaining the samethrough all the changes because, they say,
personal identity consists merely of a series ofexperiences.
Some of themclaim that someone's personhood is merely a string of psychological experiencesconnected by memories which he can tell
in a narrative. Which does not extend to his foetal stage.
They say ahuman becomes a person only as he develops an identity. And identities are madeas people interact with one another. But
the foetus cannot do that.
The foetus'parents have never known more than a mysterious presence sensed dimly by randommovements in the womb; but the parents of
a child born alive see, touch and hear their baby, witnesshis developing personality, and begin that lifelong process of communicating
and interacting with him.
Yet this viewmust say that Andy A who existed as a chain of continuous experiences from 1962(two years after his birth in 1960)
until 1990, but then lapsed into a coma, ceased to exist atthat point - and may presumably be killed with impunity.
Is the entitythat awakens in the year 2000 with no continuity of its 1962 to 1990 memories adifferent person, Andy B?
After all, Aand B's experiences are not connected by memory.
Now, supposeAndy B unexpectedly recovers all of Andy A's memories and knowledge in 2001.
Is it now AndyC, did Andy A just re-emerge, or did Andy B ever exist? Clearly, all are oneand the same Andy.
So a humanbeing maintains his nature, his personhood over time from the moment he beginsto exist.
In fact, I amaware of myself as the same person over time. Or else, I won't fear punishmentin the future for something I have done
wrong if I am caught, or feel remorse over awful past decisions.
If it were notso, I'd literally not be the same person I was last week - or when I was born.
Although thereare many physical differences between you when you were a baby and you now, youhave remained you.
This same youwere also once a foetus, an embryo, and a zygote.
Yes, you havechanged. But it is you who changed.
You being avaluable person now, you were also a valuable human and person at every momentin your past, including the time you were
in your mother's womb.
So the unbornfoetus is a human and a person of great worth because it possesses that natureas long as it exists.
If so, foetalresearch is murder. Human clinical research everywhere has always abided by theNuremberg Code defined in 1947 after
discovering the grisly medical experiments Nazis conductedon Jews, gypsies, the mentally retarded, and others.
Of all humanbeings, embryos are the most defenceless.
Thus, a moralduty exists not to harm or destroy them even if it helps others, even if some'greater good' seems achievable.
Supporters offoetal research must live with this.